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Justice　and　the　General　Point　of　View　in　Hume
Naoki　Yajima
1ntroduction
　　The　o切ective　of　Hume，s　Treatise　l　lies　in　the　elucidation　of　the　whole
range　of　morality，　and　the　theory　of　justice　is　central　in　its　theoretical
composition　and　its　practical　significance．　In　this　paper，　I　will　try　to
illuminate　Hume’s　theory　ofjustice　as　based　on　his　epistemological　position，
and　to　show　how　justice　is　fbunded　on　the　principle　of　sympathy，　while
being　established　as　an　artificial　virtue．　Hume’s　theory　of　justice　can　be
considered　as　a　systematic　succession　and　criticism　o£most　of　all，　the　ideas
of　Hobbes　and上ocke．　What　is　at　issue　is　how　to　explain　the　moral　principle
that　universally　binds　individuals　beyond　their　individual　preferences．
Hobbes　regards　the　will　of　the　sovereign　as　the　only　possible　substitute　fbr
the　universal　that　binds　individuals．　Therefbre，　the　will　of　the　sovereign
determines　justice．　Locke　denied　the　idea　of　Hobbesian　justice，　and　asse丘s
that　the　dictates　of　reason　represent　justice．　Locke’s　theory　reflects　his
concep加alism　wherein　the　discovery　of　reason　determines　the　universal．
This　difference　between　Hobbes　and　Locke　corresponds　to　their　different
pictures　of　human　beings．　Hobbes’s　picture　of　human　beings　is
且mdamentally　hedonistic，　while　Locke　views　human　beings　as　rationa1．
However，　Hobbes　and　Locke　share　the　assumption　of　individualism，　that　is，
atheory　ofpresupPosing　independent　individuals　befbre　society．
　　In　his　criticism　of　the　theory　ofjustice　in　Hobbes　and　Locke，　Hume
directs　his　fUndamental　criticism　to　their　individualism．　Hume　attempts　to
replace　their　theory　by　proposing　custom　as　the　template　ofjustice．　Custom
has　been　the　constant　theme　throughout　the　whole　of　Hume，s　Treatise．　This
is　true　also　ill　Hume曾s　theory　ofjustice．　Most　important，　making　custom　the
basis　ofjustice　illuminates　Hume’s　unique　way　of　realising　mu加ali取．　On　the
one　hand，　Hobbes7s　idea　ofmutuality　is　realised　by　the　exchange　of　positions
with　others，　i．e．　by　seeing　oneself　as　one　sees　others．　It　is　impo丘ant　to　note
that　this　is　di脆rent　f士om　the　Smithean　exchange　of　positions　that　allows
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people　to　see　themselves丘om　the　point　of　view　of　others，　which　should　be
impossible　in　Hobbesian　individualism．　On　the　other　hand，　Lockean
mutuality　is　attained　by　obeying　the　prescriptions　of　the　Natural　Law．
Lockean　mutuality　is　fbunded　on　a　rational　perspective．　Hume　rejects　both
theories　as　untrue　to　human　nature，　and　fbunds　mutuality　on　convention．
MutUality　enables　the　pursuit　of　self－interests　in　a　cooperative　manner．　The
負1ndamental　characteristic　of　Humean　justice　lies　in　showing　the　unity　of
society，　self：interest，　and　morality．　I　attempt　to　argue　that　Hume’s　general
point　of　view　is　the　unifンing　concept　behind　those　three　concepts．
　　In　section　1，　I　argue　that　justice　appears　as　a　cause　that　regulates　human
behaviour．　Justice　is　artificial　because　it　is　a　product　of　convention　and　is　not
fbund　in　nature．　In　section　2，　I　argue　that　Hume　fbunded　the　necessity　of
justice　on　the　natural　circumstances，　both　material　and　psychological，　of
human　beings．　This　explains　why　Humean　justice　is　an　artificial”virtue”
centring　primarily　on　the　relationship　of”property”．　In　section　3，　I　discuss
why　Humean　justice　realises　society　without　resorting　to　any　quasi－
universals　as　the　Hobbesian　or　the　Lockean　theories　do．　In　section　4，　I　argue
that　Humean　justice　consists　in　the　general　point　of　view　that　realises　human
mutuality　and　cooperation．　In　section　5，　I　argue　that，　unlike　the　common
allegation，　the　Humean　theory　ofjustice　comprises　a　fU11－f【edged　theory　of
rights，　and　I　show　that　Hume’s　dealings　with”rights”have　a　parallelism　with
his　dealings　with　the　concept　of”power”．　In　section　6，　I　show　that　the　rule
for　determining　property　is　far　from　arbitrary，　but　is　fbunded　on　Hume’s
theory　of　human　psychology　as　the　principle　of　human　nature．　This　paper
clarifies　that　Hume’s　theory　shows　how　public　interest　and　private　interest
coincide　in　justice．
1．Justice　as　Artificial　Virtue
　　The　most　striking　characteristic　of　Hume’s　philosophy　is　that，　whichever
topic　he　discusses，　Hume　always　sets　his　eyes　on”causation”．　So　it　is　with
his　discussion　of　the　law　of　natural　science，　and　so　it　is　with　his　discussion
of　moral　judgement．　Those　kinds　of　actions　that　cause　pleasant　sentiments　in
observers　signify　a　virtuous　character，　and　those　that　cause　painful
sentiments，　a　vicious　one．　Moral　judgement　has　as　its　object　the　motivation
of　the　agent　as　the　cause　of　virtuous　or　vicious　action．　Hume　lays　such
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emphasis　on　the　motivation　of　an　agent　precisely　because　it　causes　human
action．　When　Hume　considers　justice，　he　regards　it　as　a　kind　of　vi血e　in血e
sense　that　it　is　concemed　with　the　evaluation　ofhuman　behaviour．
　　Hume　begins　his　discussion　ofjustice　by　highlighting　seemingly
incomprehensible　phenomena．　From　the　general　observation　of　virtuous
actions，　he　observes　that　justice　is　characteristically　performed　without　being
directed　at　any　good　effect　other　than　morality；justice　seems　to　be
performed　for　no　other　reason　than　that　it　is　a　duty．　This　is　an　enigma
because　all　human　behaviour　is　motivated　by　some　good　effect　as　commonly
recognisable　in　animals．　Hume　thinks　that　the　most　fUndamental　tenet　of
morality　is　the　pleasant　or　painfU1　effect　of　an　action．　He　says，
It　appears，　therefbre，　that　all　vh加ous　actions　derive　their　merit　only　from
vh寸uous　mo廿ves，　and　are　considerld　merely　as　signs　of　those　motives．　From
this　principle　I　conclude，　that　the　flrst　vimous　motive，　which　bestows　a
merit　on　any　action，　can　never　be　a　regard　to　the　vime　of　that　action，　but
must　be　some　other　natUral　motive　or　p血ciple．．．．　We　blame　a　father　for
neglecting　his　child．　Why？because　it　shews　a　want　of　natural　affection，
which　is　the　duty　of　every　parent．　Were　not　natural　affection　a　duty，　the　care
of　children　cou’d　not　be　a　duty；and’twere　impossible　we　cou’d　have　the　duty
in　our　eye　in　the　attention　we　9ive　to　our　offsp血9．．．．
　　Ih　short，　it　may　be　establish電d　as　an　undoubted　maxim，　that　no　action　can
わεV∫1吻・US，　or　morally　good，　unless　there　be　in　human　nature　s・me・motive
友λρ70伽oθ菰dtStinctプ70m　the　sense　of　itS　morality．（T　3．2．1．4－7；SBN　478－
9）
　　It　is　noteworthy　that　Hume　thinks　that　nature　provides　us　with　the
paradigm　of　virtue．　In　other　words，　nature　shows　the　example　of　moral
behaviour　by　giving　us　motivation．　Therefbre，　normativity　is　preceded　by
some　natural　motivation，　which　is　why　human　beings　have　survived　so　far．
This　idea　is　a　very　radical　transformation　of　the　traditional　theory　，　of　the
natural　law　that　resorts　to　reason　fbr　its　prescription．　Hume’s　thesis　of　the
priority　of　passion　over　reason　as　a　moral　paradigm　is　related　to　this
position．　If　vi血ous　action　should　be　backed　by　some　natural　motive，　the
fact　that　not　all　types　of　virtUous　actions　can　be　explained　by　natUral　motive
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signi且es　a　breach　of　the　rule　of　na加re．　Just　actions　are　to　be　performed
regardless　of　our　natural　tendencies　and　are　often　in　conflict　with　them．
Therefbre，　the　moral　value　of　justice　has　apparently　nothing　to　do　with　the
direct　effects　of　the　action．　Artificial　vi血e　means　that　it　does　not　originate
directly丘om　nature．　Hume曾s　central　task　is　to　explain　how　this　happens．
　　Hume　titles　the　first　section　of　the　chapter　on　justice”Justice，　whether　a
natural　or　artificial　virtue？”This　in　fact　is　an　alternative　between　the
Hobbesian　and　Lockean　positions　regarding　this　matter．　And　Hume　clearly
stands　with　Hobbes．　Hume　demonstrates　the　artificiality　of　the　vi血le　of
justice　by　examining　its　three　possible　natural　motivations：”private　interest
or　reputation”（T　3．2．1．10；SBN　480），”the　love　of　mankind”（T　3．2．1．12；
SBN　481），　and”private　benevolence，　or　a　regard　to　the　interests　of　theparリノ
concerガd”（T　3．2．1．13；SBN　482）．　The　first　and　the　third　of　these　are
discarded　fbr　the　similar　reason　that　justice　is　often　done　in　oPPosition　to，
not　on　behalf　o£them．　The　second　possil）ility　is　denied　because　there　is　no
such　thing　as　love　of　mankind．　This　indicates　the　evidence　that　Hume　thinks
about　justice　in　re・fe・rence　to　the　psychological　mechanism　of　human
perception　that　is　naturally　influenced　by　one曾s　close　circle．　As　clarified　in
his　theory　of　sympathy，　human　love　as　constituted　of　sentiments　changes　its
strength　in　accordance　with　the　psychological　distance丘om　the　agent．
　　The　artificiality　ofjustice　does　not　mean　that　justice　is　arbitrary，　but　that，
as　Hobbes　argues，　there　is　no　such　thing　as　justice　in　the　state　of　nature．
Obviously，　civil　society　is　not　a　state　of　nature，　and　therefbre　what
distinguishes　civil　society　from　the　state　of　nature　has　to　be　something
artificial．　Hume　adopts　an　evolutionary　explanation　to　clarify　the　nature　and
the　significance　of　justice．　Justice　is　a　central　concept　fbr　explaining　the
formation　of　society　as　an　extension　of　human　relationships．　This　essential
character　of　society　as　a　development丘om　natural　relationships　necessitates
anew　principle　that　is　not　witnessed　in　nature．　Sympathy　fUnctions　as　this
central　principle　2．　But　this　does　not　mean　that　the　artificiality　ofjustice　has
nothing　to　do　with　natural　principles．　On　the　contrary，　justice　as　artificial
virtue　must　be　understood　as　grafted　on　to　the　natural　principle　of
sympathy　3．　Unlike　Hobbes，　Hume’s　theory　ofjustice　is　an　attempt　to　show
this　continuity．
　　Therefbre，　Hume曾s　theory　of　justice　explains　the　development　of　civil
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society　as　a　product　of　human　interaction．　More　speci且cally，　it　means　that
civil　society　has　been　fbrmulated丘om　the　given　natural　conditions
surrounding　human　beings．　The　Humean　state　of　nature　comprises　1）
individual　human　beings，2）families　as　the　primitive　union　of　both　sexes
driven　by　natural　instinct　which　subsequently　results　in　reproduction，　and　3）
na加ral　enviro㎜ents．　Justice　is　at　once　the　decisive魚ctor　that　distinguishes
between　the　hypothetical　state　of　nature　and　society，　and　the　driving　fbrce
which　transforms　a　natUral　human　group　into　a　civil　society，　In　other　words，
justice　is　the　missing　Iink　between　a　natural　human　group　and　a　civil　society．
There　is　no　doubt　that　people　notice　the　advantages　of　human　cooperation
in　their　experiences　in　a　family　group．　Human　beings，　therefbre，　desire
society．　However，　there　is　a　hindrance　that　prevents　the　family　group丘om
developing　into　a　society．　Hume　is　unequivocal　about　the　specific　cause　that
hinders　the　development　of　society　from　the　family　unit．　It　is，　according　to
Hume，　man，s　self　interest　which　tends　to　fbcus　on　the　conveniences　of
himself　or　his　family　members．　Therefbre，　justice　has　to　work　as　an
oPPosing　fbrce　to　this　natural　interest．　The　artificiality　of　justice　explains
why　Hume　regards　the　vi血e　of　justice　in　connection　with　duty．　Duty　and
causation　have　an　important　fea加re　in　common　that　they　are　both　perceived
with　the　feeling　of　something　imposed丘om　outside．4The　apparent　strictness
ofjustice　is　ref【ected　in　the　fact　that　justice　is　based　on　a　different　principle
丘om　natural　virtue．　The　indifference　to　natural　reactions　explains　the
inf［exible　apPearance　of　the　artificial　virtue　ofjustice．
　　On　the　other　hand，　the　strict　apPlication　ofjustice　does　not　mean　that
justice　corrects　the　selfishness　of　man．5First，　the　natUral　tendency　of　human
nature　cannot　be　corrected．　And　second，　justice　does　not　deny　sel丘shness；
instead，　it　liberates　and，　in　a　cmcial　sense，　develops　it．　Hume　clearly　sees
that　the　natUral　tendency　of　selfishness　is　not　a　vice，　and　more　fUndamentally
there　would　be　no　need　ofjustice　without”selfishness”as　a　natural　a廿ribute
of　the　human　condition．　This　is　another　sense　in　which　justice　is　not　a　ma廿er
of　right　or「wrong．　It　is　important　to　remember　that　artificiality　is　only
possible　where　human　behaviour　is　freed　from　physical　determination，　or
仕om　an　automatic　response　to　the　immediately　preceding　condition．　In　this
respect，　the　artificiality　of　justice　presupPoses　the　development　6f　human
perceptions．　Because　of　the　formative　nature　of　perceptions，　selfish
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sentiments　gained　through　experience　can　manifest　themselves　di脆rently　in
asOClety．
　　There　is　a　deceptive　tendency　in　human　nature　that　confuses　the　final
product　with　an　independent　entity　as　can　be　seen　in　Hume’s　arguments
regarding　causation，　or　extemal　o切ects．　Justice　is　another　s呵ect　explained
by　this　tendency．　Most　natural　law　thinkers　typically　insist　that　justice　is
absolute　and　has　its　authority　in　the　etemity　or　absoluteness　of　reason．　In
order　to　reveal　the　fallacy　of　this　notion，　it　is　necessary　fbr　Hume　to　clarifシ
the　evolution　of　justice．　Hume　tries　to　naturalise　the　notion　of　justice　by
showing　its　comection　with　natural　conditions　and　human　psychology．
2．Preceding　Conditions　for　Justice
　　While　Hobbes’s　theory　of　justice　centres　on　life，　and　Locke　on　liberty，
they　aim　to　present　a　theory　fbr　deciding　and　securing　property．　Hume
agrees　with　neither　of　them　because　their　theories　do　not　match　the　principal
working　of　custom　and　imagination．　However，　Hume’s　theory　ofjustice
shares　the　common　featUre　with　Hobbes　and　Locke　in　that　he　fbcuses　on
property；Hobbes　demands　the　absolute　necessity　of　establishing　a　single
sovereign　so　that　the　allocation　of　property　is　decided　singularly，　alld　Locke
replaces　Hobbesian　theory　of　property　with　his”labour　theory”that　property
ownership　should　be　given　to　those　who　laboured　to　produce　the　property．
The　most　significant　characteristic　of・Hume’s　theory　of　justice　is　that　he
deals　with　property、ρer　se　prior　to　dealing　with　life　or　liberty．　It　is　necessary
to　understand　why　Hume　fbcuses　on　property　directly．　Some　commentators
criticise　Hume　for　his　”bias”on　property．　Typically，　Lawrence　Sc曲grees
with　A．　Woozley　and　says，
The　error　of　identifンing　the　whole　of　justice　with　the　rules　goveming
property　seems　all　too　obvious：all　those　cases　in　which　our　considered
moral　duties　con甘avene飴㎜al　legal　requirements　must　be　excluded　by
Hume，　as　must　those　cases，　far　from　uncommon　nowadays，　in　which　our
sense　of　justice　can　only　be　satisfied　through出e　exercise　of　human　「ightS・
Why，血en，　shoUld　Hume　have血ought血at”perfect　hamionジin　socie取
could　be　achieved　by　secu血g　property　and　property　r嬉hts？No　doubt　one
should　partly　blame　his　classification　of　human’goo曲nd血e　cons朕luent
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belief　that　of　these　only”such　possessions　as　we　have　acquir’d　by　our
industry　and　good　fb血ne”［T　3．2．2．7；SBN　487］present　any　serious
problems　for　political　philosophy．1　can　only　agree　that　Hume’s　analysis　here
is　woefUlly　shortsighted　and　unconvincing．（Scaff，1978：102）
　　In　fact，　this　criticism　reflects　a　prevailing　approach　to　understanding
Hume．6　Understanding　the　fU11　scope　of　the　discussion　of　property　is　the　key
to　understanding　Hume’s　theory　of　justice．　Like　Hobbes　and　Locke，　Hume
begins　his　discussion　of　the　formation　of　justice　by　conside血9　the　natural
conditions　of　human　beings．　He　maintains　that　there　are　two　conditions　that
describe　the　natural　circumstances　of　human　beings：”the　selL17shness　and
COηノin　’d「generosiり2　qズ〃zan，　along　W∫疏the　5FC6Zηり～provision〃atz〃εhas〃zade
プbr　his　wants”（T　3．2．2．18；SBN　495）．　Justice　is　contingent　on　these　natural
conditions．　This　means　that　were　these　conditions　different，　there　would　be
no　justice；with　unlimited　natural　resources，　or　with　divinely　inspired
benevolence　toward　other　people，　there　is　no　need」f（）r　justice．　Also，　if
people’s　possessions　could　not　be　transferred丘om　one　person　to　another，
justice　is　purposeless．　Therefbre，　Humean　justice　is　neither　logical　nor
absolute．
　　These　initial　conditions　prior　to　civil　society　already　reveal　the
血ndamental　fimction　that　justice　should　fUlfi1．　The　contents　of　justice　are
deterrnined　by　the　initial　conditions　ofthe　natUral　circumstances　of　mankind．
First，　the　limited　amount　of　natural　resources　means　that　people　cannot　take
as　much　as　they　wish．　Therefbre，　it　will　be　necessary　to　set　a　limit　on　their
possessions，　and　this　containment　of　desire　is　the　basis　of　the　system　of
property　as　nlles　of　possessions．　Thus，　in　light　of　the　first　condition，　Hume’s
theory　of　justice　comes　to　be　concemed　with　the　problem　of　distribution　of
goods．　Second，　in　order　to　cope　with　the　limited　benevolence　of　people，
justice　has　to　be　considered　in　reference　to　the　moral　dispositions　of　people．
Thus，　in　light　of　the　second　condition，　Humean　justice　is　to　fUnction　as　a
virtue．
　　In　this　way，　the　basic　nature　of　Humean　justice　is　broadly　based　on　the
historical　condition　in　which　people　are　placed　preceding　society．　For
Hobbes，　justice　has　its　roots　in　anti－reality　ill　the　sense　that　justice　is　a　means
to　prevent　falling　into　a　condition　without　justice；and　for・Locke，　justice　has
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its　roots　in　a　trans－reality（an　ideal）that　ought　ideally　to　be　realised　by
people．　For　Hume，　justice　is　a　means　of　coping　with　human　circumstances
which　are　a　result　of　our　natural　environment　and　human　psychology．
　　Limited　benevolence　does　not　mean　that　human　beings　are　totally　self－
regarding，　but　that　human　benevolence　can　extend　only　as　far　as　the　reach　of
sympathy．　Hume　thinks　that”all　the　kind　affections，　taken　together＿over－
balance　all　the　selfishness”（T　3．2．2．5；SBN　487）．　Because　of　this，　people　are
capable　of　abiding　by　the　rules　ofjustice　spontaneously，　not　based　on　selfish
motivation，　in　other　words，　without　being　enforced　by　an　extemal　power．
Though　a　spontaneous　nlle　of　justice　is　unthinkable　in　Hobbes，　Hume’s
theory　of　sympathy　prepares　the　psychological　mechanism　that　enables　just
that．7As　Hume　says，
By　this　means［N．B．　convention］，　every　one　knows　what　he　may　safely
possess；and　the　passions　are　restrain，d　in　their　partial　and　contradictory
motions．　Nor　is　such　a　restraint　contrary　to　these　passions；fbr　if　so，　it　could
never　be　enter’d　into，　nor　maintain，d；but　it　is　only　contrary　to　their　heedless
and　impetuous　movement．（T　3．2．2．9；SBN　489）
　　This　moderate　picture　of　human　psychology　is　the　necessary　condition　for
human　beings　to　adapt　themselves　to　the　new　order　that　places　them　in　a
compatible　relationship　with　other　people　in　generaL　This　contrasts　sharply
with　the　Hobbesian　people　who　cannot　alter　their　fUndamentally　ego－centred
psychology．　Therefore，　Hume’s　theory　of　justice　is　linked　to　the
psychological　characteristic　of　human　beings，　which　enables　men　to　form　a
society　without　an　external　fbrce　acting　upon　them．　Practicability　which　is
implied　in　convention　is　a　key　notion　in　the　Humean　theory　of　justice・
Because　society　is　a　product　of　causal　interactions，　society　is　rightly
construed　as　originating　in　human　natUre．　Hume，s　basic　understanding　of
society　ascribes　the　origin　to　convention　in　oPPosition　to　the　idea　of　a
product　of　design　either　by　people　or　by　natUre．8
　　Hume　thinks　that　human　beings　must　have　fully　experienced　the
disadvantages　of　their　natural　conditions　and　the　advantages　of　human
cooperation　befbre　they　obtain　the　virtue　of　justice．　In　other　words，　it　is
impossible　that　human　beings　come　to　notice　the　necessity　of　justice　by
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abstract　reasoning．　In　bontrast，　Hobbes　asserts　that　the　absolute　necessity　of
justice　is　appreciated　by　thought　experiment．　For　Hume，　family　life　provides
not　only　the　fruit　of　co－operation　but　also　the　necessary　training　fbr　co－
operating　with　other　people．　However，　the　family　unit　as　the　first　and　most
primitive　form　of　society　itself　poses　a　problem　as　man　tries　to　develop　it
into　a　larger　unit　in　order　to　enhance　the　advantages　of　human　cooperation．
A　different　principle　is　required　to　form　society　than　the　natural　p血ciple　at
work　in　the　family．　At　this　point，　Hume　recognises　the　occasion　of　the
emergence　ofjustice；justice　is　required　in　order　to　develop　society　by
breaking　the　natural　tie　of　the　family．　This　requires　a　contradicting　fbrce　to
human　psychology　that　tends　to　fbcus　on　onels　proximate　relations．　Justice
consists　in　overcoming　this　contradiction　between　the　natural　tendencies　of
human　nature　and　society．　And　society　consists　in　human　relationships　that
are　beyond　direct　perception．
3．The　Stability　of　Property
　　With　the　explanation　of　natural　conditions，　neither　as　an　unrealistic
hypothesis　nor　as　an　ideal，　Hume　clarifies　the　concrete　step　needed　fbr
creating　society．　It　is　to　coordinate　the　property　relationship　among　human
beings．　Justice　as　the　principle　of　society　emerges　as　a　process　of　a（加sting
the　relationship　between　people　and　ohlects，　rather　than　between　peoPle　as
in　Hol）bes，　or　between　govemment　and　people　as　in　Locke．　The　primary
model　of　the　co皿ection　between　human　beings　and　property　is　already
illustrated　in　Hume’s　theory　of　sympathy．　In　this　gense，　Hume’s　theory　of
justice　compensates　his　theory　of　sympathy　which　explains　how　natural
things　are　transformed　into　property　that　is　backed　by　mutual　recognition．
Possession　of　material　goods　contributes　to　the　creation　of　an　evaluation　of
the　self　And　people　are　naturally　inclined　to　possess　extemal　goods　fbr　the
sake　of　improving　their　self」image，　via　the　evaluation　of　other　people．　Here，
in　a　different　manner　from　Hobbes　or　Locke，　is　the　source　of　people’s　quest
f‘）rexternal　goods．　Clearly，　unrestricted　selfLinterests　and　avarice　bring
disorder　to　social　relationships．　Therefbre，　in　order　to　attain　stability，　it　is
necessary　to　redirect　the　sentiment　of　self－interest　properly　so　that　it　is　not
destructive　to　society・
　　Hume　classifies　human　goods　into　three　categories：”the　internal
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satisfaction　of　our　mind，　the　external　advantages　of　our　body，　and　the
enjoyment　of　such　possessions　as　we　have　acqur’d　by　our　industry　and　good
fbr帆me”（T　3．2．2．6；SBN　487）．　Hume　concludes　that　the　third　kind　of　good
is　the　only　obj　ect　with　which　justice　is　concerned．　First，　inner　peace　of　mind
cannot　be　an　ohject　ofjustice，　fbr　it　is　not　an　ohject　of　possession，　and　thus　it
is　safe　fヒom　any　robbery．　It　is　appropriate　to　take　this　as　his　defence　of　the
freedom　of　faiths．　Second，”the　external　advantages　of　our　body”is
excluded，　fbr　as　Hume　says，　they”may　be　ravish曾d　fbr　us，　but　can　be　of　no
advantage　to　him　who　deprives　us　of　them”（T　3．2．2．7；SBN　487）．　This
implies　a　criticism　ofthe　Lockean　theory，　which　is　based　on　the　fUndamental
property　of　one’s　body．9Hume　does　not　count　the　body　as　one　of　one’s
possessions，　because　it　is　not　an　o切ect　of　artificial　arrangement，　nor　is　it
transferable．lo　If　the　body　is　recognised　as　one’s　property，　it　presents　a
problem　to　the　ontological　status　of　the”self’．　If　the　owner　of　the　body　must
be　different　from　the　body　itself，　then　where　is　the　owner　of　the　body？The
situation　would　be　fUrther　complicated　i£fbr　example，　parents　claimed　the
body　of　their　child　as　their　possession．11　Thus，　in　order　to　recognise　one’s
body　as　a　property，　one　has　to　sul）scribe　to　the　metaphysical　assumption　of
the　Cartesian　self　or　the　Lockean　mind　as　substance（Cf　E∬ay　2．23．5）12．
　　However，　unlike　mind　and　body，　the　sitUation　is　completely　different　with
external　goods　in　that　they　are　at　once　very　easily　transferable，　and
vulnerable　to　the　violence　of　other　peoPle．　Extemal　goods　can　be　usefUl　to
any　person，　and　can　cause　disputes　among　people　regarding　their　ownership．
Most　of　al1，　they　are　the　o切ect　of　people’s　avarice　and　self　interest．　Not　only
do　disputes　regarding　ownership　ignite　the　fiercest　kind　of　stmggle，　they　are
totally　destructive　to　society　itself．　Therefbre，　ownership　is　a　social
constnlction，　and　must　be　recognised　by　people　in　generaL
　　The　fundamental　threat　fbr　the　stability　of　a　society　is　the　general
tendency　of　people　to　violate　the　possessions　of　others，　rather　than　a　specific
threat丘om　specific　people，　precisely　because　society　itself　consists　in　the
generality，　and　cannot　cope　with　a　general　tendency　to　disorder．　For
example，　if　likely”burglars”can　be　specified　in　advance，　and　the　number　is
relatively　small，　justice　will　not　be　necessary；people　have　only　to　remove
those　dangerous　causes　to　resolve　the　problem　once　and　fbr　all．　On　the　other
hand，　if　people　in　general　are　convincingly　determined　to　violate　the
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possessions　of　others，　i．e．，　when止e　whole　society　is　swarming　with曲ns，
or　in　a　state　of　emergency，　to　protect　people曾s　possessions丘om　others　would
be　too　much　a　burden　to　carry，”the　suspension　of　all　laws　ofjustice”would
be　the　result（EPM　133．16；SBN　190）．　In　order　fbr　justice　to　obtain，　society
should　be　more　or　less　dominated　by　a　general　tendency　to　justice，　though
possibly　accompanied　by　some　exceptions．
　　Therefbre，　it　is　not　arbitrary　that　Humegs　theory　of　justice　centres　on
property．　Hume　even　emphasises　that　once　the　system　of　property　is
introduced，”there　remains　Iittle　or　nothing　to　be　done　towards　settling　a
perfect　harmony　and　concord，1（T　3．2．2．12；SBN　491）．　Hume　understands
that　it　is　not　correct　that　the　main　threat　to　society　comes　from　violence
toward　other　people（cf　Baier，1991：221；Postema，1986：103－4）．　Even　if
violence　destroys　society，　it　is　only　a　proximate　cause，　and　there　is　a　fUrther
root　cause　fbr　it．14　His　theory　of　sympathy　supplies　the　ground　fbr　his
position；human　beings　have　no　natural　desire　to　injure　other　people．　Human
beings　are　naturally　disinclined　to　cause　pain　under　nomial　circumstances
because　of　the　mechanism　of　sympathy．　In　the　case　of　sporadic　breaches，
people　can　cope　with　them　by　natural　principles．　However，　the　situation　is
totally　different　in　the　case　of　property，　Human　avarice　toward　extemal
goods　knows　no　satisfaction．　And　it　is　the　main　cause　of　people　inflicting
violence　on　others．　People　conflict　with　each　other，　often　resorting　to
violence　as　a　means　to　obtain　extemal　goods．
　　Ifpeople　come　to　notice　the　benefit　of　society　and　recognise　the　cause　that
tends　to　disturb　it，　it　should　be　only　natural　fbr　them　to　search　fbr　a　way　to
escape丘om　the　trouble．　Social　disorder　is　nothing　but　the　lack　of　stability．
Therefbre，　people　look　for　stability．　In　Hume，　the　convention　of　not
violating　the　possessions　of　others　represents　a　moderate　awareness　of　the
pre　ference　fbr　peace．　This　can　be　seen　as　a　moderate　version　of　the
Hobbesian　tUrn　from　war　to”peace”in　the，，Fundamental　Law　of　Nature”
（Leviathan，1．14）15．　Therefbre，　people　in　Hume　naturally　try　to　attain
stability　just　as　people　in　Hobbes　seek　peace　to　escape丘om　the　fear　of　a　war
of　all　against　a1L　Now　the　problem　is　how　to　attain　the　stability　of
possessions．　Hobbesian　people　hastily　jump　to　the　solution　of　the　mutual
covenant　and　the　establishment　of　a　common　and　absolute　authority　by
relinquishing　one’s　natural　rights．　People　in　Hume，　on　the　other　hand，　have
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no”rights”to　renounce　prior　to　society．　The　Humean　artificial　virtue　of
justice　has　to　be　developed　not　instantly　but　in　a　gradual　process，　so　that
Hume’s　explanation　is　not　a　hypothesis　to　be　justified　but　an　explanation　of
human　nature．
　　In　the　place　ofthe　Hobbesian　natural　right，　Hume　observes　that　there　is　an
altemative　mechanism　equipped　in　human　nature　that　serves　to　procure　the
stability　of　property，　which　is　the　psychological　tendency　of　attaclment　to
onegs　possessions．　This　is　what　Hume　explains　as　the　second　definition　of
being”natural旧’as　oppos’d　to　what　is　unusual”（T　3．1．2．10；SBN　474）．
Unlike　the　once　and　for　all　determination　of　reason，　custom　can　be　formed
only　gradually，　which　makes　abiding　by　the　mles　of　justice　apPear　natural
which　is　the　hallmark　of　the　stability　of　a　society．　Hume　is　obviously　critical
of　the　idea　of　people　resorting　to　authorities　to　acquire　peace，　because　this　is
too　abstract　and　complicated　an　idea　to　be　embraced　naturally．16　Human
beings　feel　attached　to　the　possessions　with　which　they　engage　in　their　daily
activities．　Habitual　actions　give　people　the　occasion　of　improvement　of
skills，　and　eventually　lead　to　the　increase　of　the　material　conditions　of　the
society．　All　these　are　impossible　where　there　is　no　stability，　since　without
stability　people　cannot　habitually　repeat　their　daily　activities；without
practice，　there　is　no　improvement・
　　Once　stability　is　recognised　as　the　sine　qua　non　of　the　good　life，　the　most
effective　way　to　secure　stability　is　easily　fbund；concentrate　on　one’s　own
while　letting　others　work　in　the　same　manner．　It　is　noteworthy　that　by
concentrating　on　one’s　own，　one　naturally　leaves　the　possession　of　others　to
themselves．　And　the　latter　is　subordinate　to　the　fbrmer．　Sympathy　is
involved　in　this　process　in　a　double　sense；aperson’s　concentration　on　his
own　possession　is　motivated　by　the　evaluation　of　others，　which　is　conveyed
by　sympathy，　and　people　ref士ain　from　violating　the　possessions　of　others
because　sympathy　urges　them　not　to　do　so．　As　this　practice　is　precisely　ill
accordance　with　the　psychological　mechanism，　justice　can　prevail　naturally
among　ordinary　people　without　resort　to”fear”or”reason”．　Furthemlore，
with　the　formation　of　this　convention，　any　breach　of　the　convention　appears
umatural．　There　is　only　one　more　step　befbre　the　convention　is　proclaimed
as　a　conventional　law，　which　becomes　the　initial　law　ofjustice．　Because　of
convention，　people　are　naturally　initiated　into　the　practice　of　fbllowing　the
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mles　of　justice，　which　will　expand　as　necessary．　Also，　the　practice　implies
the　initial　idea　of　rule　by　law．
　　This　convention　proves　to　be　a　significant　solution　to　the　problem　of　how
to　form　a　society．　It　b血gs　an　unintended　and　very　significant　consequence
with　it．　Society　is　based　on　a　crucially　different　principle　from　the　family．
And　this　is　that　the　latter　is　constitUted　by　anonymous　people　or　people　in
genera1　while　the　former　is　constitUted　by　members　all　of　whom　are　known
to　each　other．　Therefore，　to　form　a　social　union，　there　has　to　be　a　p血ciple
that　serves　to　unite　people　who　are　unknown　to　each　other．　Convention
meets　this　requirement　because　it　is　a　principle　of　generality；convention，
like　language　or　money，　serves　to　no　specific　person　or　no　specific　purpose．
The　scope　that　is　determined　by　the　same　convention　demarcates　a　society．
By　resorting　to　convention，　people　can　relate　with　each　other　beyond　the
natural　reach　of　their　physical　and　psychological　contact．　And　the
convention　not　to　violate　other　people電s　property　can　prevail　because　it　is　in
accordance　with　human　nature．　It　is　practicable　fbr　all　the　members　of　a
society　to　participate　in　the　fbrmation　ofjustice　without　any　prior
arrangement，　because　everyone　always　and　already　has”what　is　the　most
proximate　to　him”．　Therefbre，　there　is　no　inconsistency　in　Hume　between
the　creation　of　convention　and　the　stability　of　society．　Without　intending　the
overall　effect，　the　convention　of　adhering　to　one’s　own　possession　naturally
brings　stability　to　the　whole　society．　In　other　words，　there　is　no　contradiction
between　the　means　and　the　end　in　attaining　peace　in　Hume．　Because
individual　activity　realises　the　unintended　stability　of　society，　it　is　no　wonder
that　the　final　apPearance　ofjustice　gives　birth　to　the　vulgar　notion　of
providence．
4．Mutuality　and　the　General　Point　of　View
The　formation　of　the　concept　of　justice　is　the　most　significant　point　in
Hume’s　theory　of　justice・This　is　different　from　the　explanation　of　why　we
apProve　the　act　ofjustice．　This　problem　is　misleading　because　it　presupPoses
the　separation　of　the　reason　fbr　our　obeying　the　nlles　ofjustice　fヒom　their
formation　and　existence．17　Hume’s　theory　of　justice　as　based　on　convention
purports　to　avoid　this　dichotomy．　For　Hume，　justice　exists　only　as　a
fUnctioning　norm　of　vi血e　that　binds　people．　Hume　compares　justice　to　a
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religiOUS　rite：
’tis　one　of　the　most　mysterious　and　incomprehensible　operations　that　can
possibly　be㎞agin蟹¢and　may　even　be　compar，d　to〃’ansubstantiation，　or
holy　orders，　where　a　certain　form　of　wordS，　along　with　a　certain　intention，
changes　entirely　the　nature　of　an　extemal　o切ect，　and　even　of　a　human
creature．（T　3．2．5．14；SBN　524）
　　This　means　that　natural　o切ects　acquire　an　entirely　different　meaning　in
accordance　with　the　instruction　of　the　system　of　justice　to　society．
Accordingly，　people　behave　in　a　totally　di脆rent　manner　toward　the　same
o切ect　when　subscribing　to　the　principle　of　justice．　In　this　sense，　justice　is
compared　to　a　religious　rite，　money，　or　language　where　the　significances　are
detached丘om　their　physical　materials．
　　In　the　psychological　sense　justice　consists　of　necessity　fbr　controlling
people曾s　behaviour　in　general．　In　other　words，　justice　exists　as　our
convention　of　behaving　on　the　supPosition　ofjustice．　Here　is　the　parallelism
between　causation　and　justice．’8　The　concept　ofjustice　is　solid　because　it　is
deeply　interwoven　into　our　social　conventions　which　come　prior　to　our
personal　consciousness．　Therefbre，　justice　is　not　a　dictate　of　reason．　It　is　also
mistaken　to　identify　the　explanation　of　the　concept　ofjustice　with　a
justification　of　the　current　system　of　property．1g　Hume’s　theory　of　justice　is
the　story　of　how　the　concept　of　justice　emerges　in　an　empirical　manner・
Only　the　apPlication　of　justice　can　be　the　su切ect　of　justification，　but　the
justification　is　first　possible　on　the　basis　of　the　notion　ofjustice　itsel£Thus，
it　is　possible　to　ask　whether　something　is　just，　but　it　is　impossible　to　justify
the　concept　ofjustice　itself20．　It　is　to　the　latter　that　Hume　supplies　a
naturalistic　explanation．
　　The　conventional　stability　of　property　does　not　simply　mean　the
restriction　of　the　blind　pursuit　of　selfLinterest．　More　significantly，　convention
introduces　a　new　dimension　to　the　notion　of　selfLinterest；it　is　an　interest　not
directly　pursued，　but　realised　through　mutUality．　In　the且rst　place，　Hume’s
theory　of　sympathy　reveals　that　the　purely　individual　benefit　that　is
independent　of　social　recognition　is　a　deception　precisely　because
individuals　are　a　social　creation．21　Even　seemingly　purely　physical　desires
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appear　and　are　fUlfilled　only　in　a　social　manner．　One　camot　even　understand
”thirsty，’or”hungry”until　one　leams　how　to　deal　with　them；that　babies　feel
l’thirstier”or”hungrier”only　as　uncomfortable　sitUations　is　evidence　ofthis．
　　In　a　similar　sense，　the　idea　of　individual　interests　without　sound
community　is　only　a　deception。　For　something　to　be　valuable　it　has　to　be
recognised　by　others．　Most　notably，　money　is　only　a　piece　of　paper　without
social　recognition．22　Therefbre，　justice　serves　to　create　and　coordinate
interests　in　the　social　dimension　of　life．　No　human　being　can　work
exclusively　for　himself，　or　even　by　himself．　Human　activities　have　influence
upon　others　in　a　ma皿er　that　is　beyond　direct　perceptions，　and　human　lives
are　supported　by　the　works　of　others　beyond　identification．　For　example，
clothes，　fbod，　and　houses　are　goods　resulting　from　the　activities　ofnumerous
others．　In　this　sense，　individuals　are　related　to　all　of　society．　Theref（）re，
Humean　justice　is血ndamentally　a　p血ciple　of　human　mutUality．　Hobbesian
mutUality　lies　in　the　recognition　of　the　equality　of　others　with　oneself，　which
occurs　prior　to　the　establishment　of　a　sovereign．　Lockean　individuals　realise
mutuality　by　the　equal　application　of　the　prescription　of　the　natural　law　to
all．　For　Hume，　however，　mutuality　is　realised　through　convention　in　which
people　seek　self－　interest　in　a　cooperative　scheme　with　others．　This　is
possible　when　one　is　expected　to　behave　in　the　same　manner　he　expects
others　to　behave　toward　him．　Hume　explains，
Taking　any　single　act，　my　justice　may　be　pemicious　in　every　respect；and・’tis
only　upon　the　supposition，　that　others　are　to　imitate　my　example，　that　1　can
be　induc’d　to　embrace　that　virtue；since　nothing　but　this　combination　can
render　justice　advantageous，　or　afford　me　any　motives　to　conform　myself　to
its　mles．（T　3．2．2．22；SBN　498）
　　This　shows　that　justice　implies　mutuality　of　the　self　and　others．　And
mutUality　factUally　implies　the　equality　of　the　people．　Because　the　mle　of
justice　already　prevails　the　rule　ofjustice，　people　can　rely　on　it，　even
abandoning　seemingly　immediate　interests，　This　is　first　possible　when
people　are　freed　from　the　direct　pursuit　of　self－interest．　People　depart丘om
their　immediate，　self－centred　reactions　by　correcting　initial　perceptions．　In
this　sense，　justice　is　fbunded　on　the　generality　of　perceptions，　rather　than　on
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overtly　normative　P血ciples　such　as　impaniality，　rationality，　or　fairness・
　　For　Hume，　mutuality　does　not　mean　that　people　must　engage　in　a　joint
enterprise．　On　the　contrary，　in　Humean　convention，　each　person　has　only　to
do　his　duty，　and　to　leave　the　rest　to　other　people．　Behind　this　lies　a
realisation　that　self」interest　can　be　realised　most　ef巨ciently　by　taking　care　of
one’s　own　possessions，　while　leaving　the　possessions　of　others　to　other
people．　In　fact，　when　one　is　to　relate　with　others，　all　one　can　do　is　to　work　on
his　own　possessions　in　a　socially　recognised　manner．　This　is　a　paradoxical
way　of　actualising　self：interest，　and　can　never　be　invented　by　any　abstract
reasoning．　The　emergence　of　this　convention　can　only　originate　from
experience，　but　the　final　figure　apPears　like　a　product　of　design　or
providence　because　it　is　beyond　individual　intention．　This　is　best　illustrated
by　a　commercial　society　based　on　the”partition　of　employments”that　Hume
had　anticipated　both　in　theory　and　in　his　personal　experience　23．　Hume
illustrates　the　convention　of　mutual　expectation　in　the　well一㎞own　example
of　the　people　rowing　a　boat　together．
Iobserve　that　it　will　be　fbr　my　interest　to　leave　another　in　the　possession　of
his　goods，　provided　he　Wi11　act　in　the　same　manner　with　regard　to　me．　He　is
sensible　of　a　like　interest　in　the　regulation　of　his　conduct．　When　this
common　sense　of　interest　is　mutUally　express’d，　and　is　known　to　both，　it
produces　a　suitable　resolution　and　behaviour．＿Two　men，　who　pull　the　oar
of　a　boat，　do　it　by　an　agreement　or　convention，　tho’they　have　never　given
pmmises　to　each　otheL（T　3．2．2．10；SBN　490）
Hume　compares　the　British　lsles　to　the　boat．　The　boatmen　do　not　pull　the
oars　independently，　fbr　each　pulls　the　oar　counting　on　the　other　doing　the
same　thing，　Through　convention，　people　begin　to　act　counting　on　the　action
of　un㎞own　people　in　pursuit　of　their　self－interest．　People　rely　upon　other
people　who　behave　in　the　same　manner．　Thus，　the　Humean　mutuality　is
fUndamentally　neither　moral，　nor　rational，　but　conventional．　This　represents
the　most　fUndamental　basis　of　the　solid　interdependence　among　people．241f
the　mutuality　were　to　depend　on　the　will　of　others，　it　would　be　as丘agile　as
the　arbitrary　will　of　others．　But　as　it　depends　on　custom，　the　mutuality　has
all　the　advantages　and　solidity　of　custom．　Hume　illustrates　the　difference
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between　benevolence　and　justice　in　an　example丘om　architecture．
The　happiness　and　prosperity　of　mankin¢arising丘om　the　social　vhtue　of
benevolence　and　its　subdivisions，　may　be　compared　to　a　wall，　built　by　many
hands，　which　still　rises　by　each　stone　that　is　heaped　upon　it，　and　receives
㎞crease　propo血onal　to　the　diligence　and　care　of　each　workman．　The　same
hapPiness，　raised　by　the　social　vime　ofjustice　and　its　subdivisions，　may　be
compared　to　the　building　of　a　vaulちwhere　each血φvidual　stone　would，　of
itsel£f田1　to　the　ground；nor　is　the　whole　fabric　suppOrted　but　by　the　mutUal
assis伽ce　and　combination　of　itS　correspOnd㎞g　pa貢s．（EPM　Appendix　3．5；
SBN　305）
　　This　clearly　suggests　that　the　essence　ofjustice　consists　in　mutual
dependency；people　supPort　each　other　by　being　Placed　in　a　situation　of
connecting　with　and　supporting　each　other．　A　vault　would　collapse，　were　the
individual　stones　that　comprise　it　separated　from　each　other．　They　are　not
arranged　by　an　organiser丘om　outside．　Likewise　justice　creates　the　mutual
relationship　in　which　each　individual　depends　on　others．　Though　each
member　directly　connects　only　with　his　neighbours，　they　contribute　to，　and
obtain　benefit丘om　the　whole　constmction　of　society．　Justice　guarantees　the
point　of　view　that　sees　one’s　interests　from　the　common　perspective　of　other
people　in　generaL　Thus，　justice　represents　the　general　point　of　view．25
　　The　primary　fUnction　ofjustice　is　to　enable　people　to　concentrate　on　their
own　work，　without　worrying　too　much　about　the　behaviour　of　others，　in　the
understanding　that　others　do　the　same．　Thus　Hume　rewrites　the　Lockean
concept　of　labour．　Humean　individuals　work　with　their　possession，　while
Lockean　individuals　are　supposed　to　act　on　nature．　In　this　sense，　Hume’s
theory　is　more　tuned　to　describing　industrialised　society．　Once　justice　is
established，　it　defines　the　meaning　of　interest　as　well　as　the　way　of　realising
personal　interest．　This　is　because　justice　requires　abandoning　the　direct
pursuit　of　particular　interests．　As　Hume　says，
A　single　act　ofjustice　is　frequently　contrary　to、public　interest；and　were　it　to
stand　alone，　without　being　follow’d　by　other　acts，　may，　in　itself，　be　very
prejudicial　to　society．　When　a　man　of　merit，　of　a　beneficent　disposition，
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restores　a　great　fbrtu血e　to　a　miser，　or　a　sedidous　bigoちhe　has　acted　justly
and　laudably，　but　the　public　is　a　real　sufferer．＿But　however　s血gle　acts　of
justice　may　be　contrary，　either　to　public　or　private　interest，’tis　certain，　that
the　whole　plan　or　scheme　is　highly　conducive，　or　indeed　absolutely　requisite，
both　to　the　support　of　society，　and　the　well－being　of　every　individual．（T
3．2．2．22；SBN　497）
　　Hume　emphasises　that　justice　gives　a　meaning　to”a　single　act”different
from　its　direct　effect．　The　fU11　meaning　of　a　single　action　is　not　determined
only　by　its　direct　effect．261n　this　way，　Humels　theory　is　thoroughly
associative．　This　is　clearly　explained　in　his　theory　of　abstract　ideas；what
confers　meaning　to　a　particular　is　the　general　effect　of　its　similar　kind　as　is
shown　in　his　theory　of”abstract　ideas”．　In　the　same　mamer，　a　single　action
does　not　have　general　meaning　until　it　is　evaluated　as　a　particular　of　its
general　kind，　which　is　realised　through　the　creation　of　a　new　convention．
The　mealling　of　interest　between　the　pre－social　state　and　social　state　is
totally　different；individual　interest　is　possible　only　in　the　social　state・In
fhct，　Hume　is　no　less　uncompromising　about　the　necessity　of　justice　than
Hobbes．　Hume　says　in　a　Hobbesian　tone：
And　even　every　individual　person　must　find　himself　a　gainer，　on　balancing
止e・account；s血ce，舳out　jusdce，　s㏄ie取m耐immediately　dissolve，　and
every　one　must　fall　into　that　savage　and　solitary　condition，　which　is　infinitely
worse　than　the　worst　situatioll　that　can　possibly　be　suppos，d　in　society．（T
3．2．22；SBN　497）
　　Justice　is　necessary　fbr　sustaining　society，　and　without　society　Hume
understands　human　life　is　as　bad　as　the　Hobbesian　description　of　the　state　of
nature．　Fundamentally，　justice　has　more　to　do　with　the　framework　in　which
the　interest　is　produced．　The　Humean　sense　of　justice　as　personal　interest
does　not　make　sense　without　supposing　a　point　of　view　that　represents
particular　action　in　its　generality．　Just　as　in　custom　particulars　are　regarded
as　instances　of　the　generality　the　convention　ofjustice　enables　people　to　see
their　behaviour　in　the　general　scheme　ofjustice．
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5．Rights　as　Causation
　　While　Locke　certainly　does　not　mean　to　surprise　us　by　the　concept　of
property　when　he　refers　to　our　body　as　the　first　thing　we　have　as　property，
Hume　induces　us　to　be　surprised　by　the　mysterious　power　of　property，　as　he
compares　it　to　”superstitions”（EMP　3．36；SBN　l　98）27．　However，　property　is
indeed　quite　mysterious　if　we　view　it　ffom　a　causal　perspective．　Hume　says，
The　same　species　of　reasonillg　it　may　be　thought，　which　so　success血lly
exposes　superstition，　is　also　apPlicable　to　justice；nor　is　it　possible，㎞the　one
case　more　than　in　the　o止er，　to　point　out，　in　the　object，　that　precise　quality　or
circumstance，　which　is　the　fbundation　of　the　sen血1ent．
　　But　there　is　this　material　difference　betWeen　sUρerstition　and／ustice，　that
the拓㎜er　is飼volous，　useless，　and　burdensome；the　latter　is　absolutely
reqUisite　to　the　well－being　of　mankind　and　eXistence　of　society．（EPM　3．37－
8；SBN　199）
　　Property　consists　in　the　mysterious　power　to　prevent　all　people　except　the
owner　from　using　it．　Why　is　it　that　the　same　physical　object　can　exert　such
different　causal　influences　on　people’s　behaviour？There　is　no　such　thing　as
property　in　nature；all　we　perceive　in　nature　are　particular　o切ects．　And　none
of　them　bears　any　sign　that　presents　itself　as　a　property　of　a　particular
person・Stil1，　property　exerts　a　power　to　regulate　and　control　people，s
behaviour・Once　justice　is　established，　people　will　be　fbrced　to　respect　the
property　of　others　by　a　morality　that　is　endorsed　by　a　political　authority．　No
individual　is　more　strongly　obliged　to　re丘ain　from　using　another’s　property
than　any　other　person．28　Therefbre，　property　means　nothing　but　this
umatural　power　which　reaches　each　and　every　member　of　the　society　with
an　equally　binding　fbrce．
　　It　is　clear　that　the　power　of　property　does　not　derive　from　any　inherent
quality　of　the　o切ect．　Thus，　the　power　can　only　derive　from　a　relation，　which
is　represented　by　the　general　point　of　view．　Property　consists　in　a　causal
power　that　in　a　sense　parallels　the　psychological　sense　of　necessity．　There　is
no　essential　difference　between　the　power　of　a　physical　o切ect　and　that　of
property　in　that　both　compel　a　certain　type　of　behaviour　based　on　acquired
beliefs．　Through　convention，　people　feel　compelled　to　reffain丘om　violating
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the　domain　of　others．　The　power　of　property　is　in　reality　nothing　but　those
collective　negative　commitments　of　individuals．　In　this　way，　Hume　explains
the　rule　ofjustice　without　resorting　to　any　extemal　fbrce・
　　Unlike　the　allegation　of　some　commentators，　Hume’s　theory　of　justice
comprises　a　theory　of　rights．　Hume’s　understanding　of　property　as　a　socially
constnlcted　power　explains　the　cmcial　moral　and　political　notion　of　rights．　It
is　Hume，s　conscious　strategy　to　replace　the　Lockean　understanding　of　rights
as　an　inherent　quality　of　a　person　with　his　causal　explanation．　This　indicates
Hume’s　di脆rent　perspective；his　Copemican　tum丘om　a　substance－centred
to　a　relation－centred　notion　of　property．　Hume　explains　the　mechanism
through　which　human　beings　can　be　regarded　as　having　rights，　and　why　the
rights　command　other　people　to　behave　in　a　certain　way．　Therefore，　he　uses
asimilar　strategy　to　explain　rights　as　in　his　discussion　of　causation．　He
clearly　understands　rights　as　the　product　of　convention，
After　this　convention，　conceming　abstinence　fr（）m　the　possessions　of　others，
is　entefd　hlto，　and　every　one　has　acqu廿d　stability　hl　his　possessions，　there
㎞ediately　arise　the　ideas　ofjustice　and　h真jus廿ce；as　also　those　of、properり～
right，　and　obligation．　The　latter　are　altogether　unintelligible　without　first
understandng出e　former．　Our　pro岡is　no舳1g　but　those　goo（IS，　whose
constant　possession　is　establish「d　by　the　laws　of　society；that　is，　by　the　laws
ofjustice．　Those，　therefbre，　who　make　use　of　the　wordS　proρeay，　orガ9紘or
oわligation，　befbre　they　have　explain’d　the　origin　ofjustice，　or　eVen　make　use
of　them　in　that　explication，　are　guilty　of　a　very　gross　fallacy，　and　can　never
reason　upon　any　solid　fbundation．　A　manls　property　is　some　o切ect　related　to
him．　This　relation　is　not　natural，　but　moral，　and　fbunded　on　justice（T
3．2．2．11；SBN　491）．
　　Once　the　concept　of　right　is　established　in　the　instance　of　a　property　right，
this　concept　can　be　extended　to　cover　other　more　abstract　kinds　of　rights
such　as　human　rights，　and　social　rights．　As　property　is　nothing　but　the　moral
relationship　of　people　in　reference　to　a　certain　ohlect，　rights　are　also　the
creation　of　moral　relationships．　What　are　called　rights　are　in　the　first
instance　someone曽s　exclusive　use　of　his　possession，　which　is　empty　unless
people　in　general　protect　them．　Thus　the　notion　of　rights　emerges　with　the
55
system　ofproperty．
　　It　is　important　to　note　that　right　does　not　mean　that　people　in　general　are
obliged　to　take　some　positive　action　with　regard　to　the　right．　For　example，
the　right　to　life　does　not　entail　giving　life　to　the　person　who　asserts　it．291n
general　the　most　people　can　do　to　respect　the　right　to　life　of　other　people　is
to　partake　in　the　general　practice　of　not　taking　life，　in　the　same　mamer　that
they　do　not　violate　the　possessions　of　others．　One　individual’s　rights　are　the
obligation　of　others．　Rights　and　obligations　are　two　sides　of　the　same　coin，
To　other　people，　the　assertion　of　rights　apPears　only　as　prohibitions．　In　this
way，　people　are　associated　with　one　another　through　rights　and　obligations．
Only　if　self　and　others　are　interchangeable　with　regard　to　right　and
obligation；one　is　treated　as　the　subj　ect　of　right　by　others．　Thus　justice
consists　more　in　a　negative　commitment，　because　this　is　the　only　way　the
multitUde　ofpeople　support　a　particular　person．　Just　as　causation　is　a　product
of　imagination，　so　rights　are　products　of　the　imagination．　The　concept　of
rights　produces　the　concept　of　liberty　as　free　access　to　one’s　property．
Therefbre，　the　Humean　theory　of　justice　explains　the　realistic　condition
necessary　fbr　the　emergence　of　liberty．
6．The　Rules　for　1）etermining　Property
Some　commentators　criticise　Hume　because　he　cares　so　much　about　the
existence　and　rigid　observance　ofthe　rules　of　property，　and　yet　cares　so　little
about　which　rules　in　particular　are　adopted．30　Admittedly，　Hume　says，
That　there　be　a　separation　or　distinction　of　possessions，　and　that　this
seParation　be　steady　and　constant；this　is　al）solutely　required　by血terests　of
society，　and　hence　the　origi皿of　justice　and　property．　What　possessions　are
assigned　to　particular　persons；that　is，　generally　speaking，　pretty　indifferent；
and　is　often　determined　by　frivolous　views　and　considerations．（EPM
Appendix　3　fbotnote　65；SBN　309　fbotnote）3置
Therefore，　John　PlamenatZ　criticises　Hume　that：
We　are　seriously　invited　to　believe　that，　though　it　matters　enormously　that
there　should　be　some　rules　of　property　and　that　they　shoUld　not　change，　it
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does　not　much　matter　what　they　are．．．　that　argument　is　not　illogica1，　but　it　is
odd　and㎜ealisdc．1　am　less　moved　to　refUte　it　than　to　wonder　how　it　ever
comes　to　be　made．　I　fee1　abOut　it　as　I　should　do　if　someone　were　to　say：’lI
am　against　divorce，　b㏄ause，　while　it　does　not　much　matter　whom　we　many，
it　matters　enormously　that　we　should　marry　and　stay　manied”．32
　　The　ghost　of　Locke　is　hard　to　get　rid　o£Hume　is　certainly　indifferent
about　who　owns　what，　but　he　is　by　no　means　indifferent　about　the’”rules”　of
property．　These　two　ideas　are　cnlcially　di脆rent，　because　this　is　what　the
rule　of　law　means．　Hume　opposes　Aristotle，　Hobbes，　Pufendorf，　and　Locke，
who　imagine　they　decide　ownership　not　by”frivolous　views　and
considerations”，　but　by　the　unshakable　reasoning　of　the　j　ustificatory　ground
of　apProbation．　This　is　because　Hume’s　theory　of　justice　is　based　on　the
interchangability　of　self　and　others，　and　because　he　is　critical　of　the
possibility　that　by　serious　views　and　considerations　property　can　be
allocated　to　the　most　appropriate　person　who　really　deserves　it．　Most　of　al1，
it　is　cnlcial　to　understand　the　Humean　ground　fbr　the　five　nlles．
　　Hume　stipulates　the　following　five　rules　fbr　determining　property：
”present　possession鱒，”occupation’1，四prescription四，，，accession”and
”succession”．　Here　as　elsewhere，　his　argument　is　a　challenge　to　the
traditional　theory　of　justice．　First，　Hume’s　target　is　clearly　the　Aristotelian
tradition，　which　considers　justice　as　a　distribution　in　accordance　with　desert・
Hume　thinks　that　it　is　virtually　impossible　to　decide　individually”who
deserves　what”，　because，
so　great　is　the　mcertainty　of　merit，　both　from　itS　natural　obscurity，　and　fbom
the　self－conceit　of　each　individual，　that　no　dete㎜血ate　rule　of　conduct　would
ever　result　from　it；and　the　total　dissolution　of　society　must　be　the　immediate
consequence．（EPM　3．23；SBN　193）
　　No　one　is　willing　to　admit　that　he　deserves　less　than　his　fellows．　It　is
certainly　impossible　to　find　the　most　appropriate　owner　fbr　each　item　that
can　be　regarded　as　property．　Hume　emphatically　wams　that”Fanatics　may
supPose，　that　do〃linion　isノ～）u〃ded　o〃grace，　and　that　saints　alone　inherit　the
θα肋”（EPM　3．23；SBN　l　93）．　On　the　other　hand，　the　equal　distribution　of
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property　is　not　effective　either，　because　it　will　soon　result　in　an　inequality
given　the　difference　ofpeople’s　ability　and　industry．　Hume　says，
But　histodans，　and　even　common　sense，　may　in飴㎜us，　that，　however
specious　these　ideas　ofpetlCec’equali呼may　se㎝，血ey跡e　really，　at　bo廿om，
翅ρrαc∫’oαわ1θ；and　were　they　not　so　would　be　extremely　pernゴcious　to
human　society．（EPM　3．26；SBN　l　94）
　　As　property　is　always　particular，　it　is　theoretically　impossible　to　divide
property　in　equal　proportion．　Hume’s　argument　about　the　rules　deciding
property　endorses　his　fUndamental　view　of　justice：justice　should　not　be
fbunded　by　any　moral　concept，　such　as　right，　desert，　equality，　and　fairness．
These　are　first　understood　once　justice　is　established．　To　use　these　concepts
fbr　explaining　justice　not　only　constitutes　a　vicious　circle，　but　also　is
dangerously　misleading，　which　is　indicated　in　Humels　criticism　of
rationalistic　moral　theory．33　Thus，　Hume　avoids　the　difficulty　of　the
rationalist　theory　of　justice　and　develops　his　theory　in　a　manner　that　is　in
accord　with　human　na加re．34
　　Hume’s　five　basic　mles　fbr　deciding　property　allocation　is　not　arbitrary．
On　the　contrary　it　is　very　consistent　with　his　theory　of　convention　and
sympathy　that　he　has　so　elaborately　argued　so　far．　On　the　whole，　Hume
seems　to　adopt　the　basic　ffamework　of　the　natural　modes　of　acquisition　in
Roman　law　with　a　very　significant　difference　that　he　places”present
possession（T　3．2．3．4；SBN　503－5）”as　the　first　nlle．　Hume7s　choice　of　the
five　rules　is　based　on　the　consideration　that　they　should　be　acknowledged
and　accepted　by”the　population　at　large”．　As　convention　produces　the　only
viable　system　ofjustice，　the　rule　to　determine　property　must　be　in
congruence　with　the　principles　of　human　nature．　It　is　significant　to　note　that
the　Humean　criterion　fbr　all　five　rules　consists　in　the　psychological
attachment　to　the　o切ect　by　the　possessor．　The　sense　of　attachment　is　the
only　natural　bond　that　comects　humans　and　o切ects　beyond　direct　physical
grasp．　It　is　based　on　his　associationist　psychology　according　to　which　the
sense　of　attaclment　increases　or　decreases　in　accordance　with　the　dis臨e
丘om　the　o切ect．　In　terms　of　human　psychology，　to　possess　something　means
to　feel　stronger　attachment　to　the　thing　than　any　other　person　does．　This
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psychological　reality　should　be　reflected　in　the　legal　relationship　fbr　the
system　of　property　to　fUnction　among　people　in　general．
　　Hume　says，”Men　generally　fix　their　affections　more　on　what　they　are
possess’d　of，　than　on　what　they　never　enjoy’d”（T　3．2．1．14；SBN　482）．　All　of
the　five　rules　can　be　derived　fヒom　this　principle　that　realises　the　stability　of
the　system　ofproperty　because　a　psychological　cohesive　power　is　a　principle
of　stability．　This　should　be　seen　as　a　strong　justification　for　Hume’s　rules　of
determining　property．
We　may　conclude，　therefbre，　that，　in　order　to　establish　laws　f（）r　the
regulation　of　properけ，　we　must　be　acquainted　with　the　nature　and　situation
of　man；must　reject　appearances，　which　may　be　false，　though　specious；and
must　search　fbr　those　rules，　which　are，　on　the　whole，　most　useful　and
わeneficia乙Vulgar　sense　and　slight　experience　are　suMcient　for　this　purpose；
where　men　give　not　way　to　too　selfish　avidity，　or　too　extensive　enthusiasm．
（EPM　3．27；SBN　l　94－195）
　　Hume　tries　to　remove　the　cause　of　disturbance　by　leaving　the　problem　of
deciding　property　to　natural　principle．　In　this　way，　Hume　gives　a
psychological　fbundation　to　the　Hobbesian　law　that”those　things　that　cannot
be　enjoyed　in　common，　nor　divided，　ought　to　be　adjudged　to　the　First
Possessor；and　in　some　cases　to　the　First－Born，　as　acquired　by　Lot”
（Leviathan　l　O8）．　Certainly　in　preparation　fbr　this　argument　Hume　explains
the　importance　of　the　principle　of　imagination，　of　his　associationist
psychology　in　Book　20f　the　Treatゴ5θ．　This　is　another　example　of　the
consistency　between　each　Book　of　the　Treatise．　Therefbre，　it　is　a　mistake　to
dismiss　Hume’s　rules　as　arbitrary．　The　rules　to　decide　property　are　as
consistent　with　the　theory　of　human　nature　offered　in　Hume　as　these　are　in
Hobbes　and　Locke．　If　property　does　not　derive　from　those　rules，　the　system
of　property　cannot　prevail　spontaneously．　Humean　justice　is　necessitated　fbr
the　overall　objective　of　attaining　the　stability　of　human　relationships．　Society
is　most　stable　when　it　is　nlled　by　that　principle　that　constitutes　stability
itself
　　The　five　Humean　nlles　show　that　property　ownership　does　not　depend　on
the　inherent　quality　of　the　obj　ect　at　all。　Property　is　determined　exclusively
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by　social　convention．0切ects　have　no　claim　on　their　possessors，　precisely
because　this　is　a　unilateral　way　of　fixing　property　relations．　On　the　contrary，
because　justice　is　based　on　the　principle　of　the　mutuality　of　people，　property
circulates　in　society．　In　this　way，　anyone　can　become　an　owner　of　property，
and　property　is　transferable　in　society．　Unlike　Locke，　Hume　does　not　have　in
mind　primarily”estate”as　property．　Rather，　Hume’s　property　signifies
movable　property．　Society　is　unified　as　an　arena　fbr　the　circulation　of
property．　All　people　can　be　equally　qualified　as　owners　of　property，　which　is
the　precondition　for　a　commercial　society．　Free　commerce　presupposes　and
strengthens　the　equality　of　people　g〃αowners　of　property，　which　in　tum
develops　the　condition　for　a丘ee　and　equal　commercial　society．35　Based　on
this　fbundation　of　the　basic　law　ofjustice　as　the　stability　ofproperty，　Humels
second　law　of　justice　stipulates　the　transference　of　property　by　consent．
Thus，　the　first　law　ofjustice　forms　the　foundational　idea　ofjustice．
7．Concluding　Rem劉rks
　　We　have　seen　the　basic　structure　of　Hume’s　theory　of　justice　as　the
development　of　his　theory　of　perception．　He　criticises　Hobbesian　rational
consideration　and　Lockean　abstraction　as　the　ground　fbr　justice，　and　replaces
it　with　his　theory　of　convention．　Hume　finds　the　only　feasible　way　fbr
individuals　to　relate　in　society　is　through　a　negative　commitment；by　not
violating　the　property　of　others，　people　enter　into　a　relationship　with　society，
廿om　which　a　new　type　of　human　interaction　develops　in　accordance　with
the　rule　ofjustice．　A　morality　of　proximate　human　relationships　can　still　be
maintained　by　sympathy，　Hobbesian　covenants　and　Humean　conventions
serve　the　same　fundamental　fUnction：to　control　the　wills　of　others　by
morality．　Based　on　human　sentiments，　Hume’s　theory　of　justice　reveals　a
striking　parallelism　with　his　theory　of　causation；Hume　denies　o切ectivity　to
both　laws，　and　alleges　them　to　be　products　of　human　psychology．　The
normative　minimal　aim　of　Humean　theory　is　to　vouchsafe　stability；custom
is　at　once　stability，s　driving　fbrce　and　its　realisation．　His　theory　connects
personal　and　public　interest　in　the　system　of　justice．　Hume　shows　how
general　interest　and　self：interest　are　naturally　reinfbrced　in　the　development
of　society　through　justice．
　　Because　of　the　constmctive　nature　of　human　perceptions，　they　create　the
60
stable　public　world　as　the　stage　that　enables　human　communication，　on　the
bases　of　which，　society　is　created，　pivoting　on　property．　Humean　justice　is
fbunded　on　the　general　point　of　view　that　sees　oneself　and　others　as
particulars　in　the　same　convention．　In　this　way，　the　general　point　of　view
represents　the　comprehensive　principle　of　Humean　justice　and　morality・36
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the　act　ofjusdce（Taylor，　J．，”JUstice…md　the　Foundations　of　Soeial　Morality　in　Hume’s
Treatise”，　Hume　Studゴes，　vol．24，　no．1，　pp．5－30）．　John　Rawls　maintains　that　the
motivation　fbr　justice　is”the　desire　for　a　character”（Rawls，　J．，　Lectares　on　the、θ競αッ（ゾ
ルloral　Phゴ10soρhy，　B．　Hemlan（ed。），　Cambridge，　Mass．：Harvard　University　Press．
Rawls，2000，　P・68）・This　relates　to　our　rational　conside凱tion　of　justice，　which　apPlies
o皿yto　a卿of　H㎜e°s　theory　of　justice．　The　gist　of　Hume’s血eory　of　justice　in血e
Treatise　lies　in　its　connection　to　perceptions　in　general．　A忌　we　will　see　below，　the
norrnative　argument　ofjustice　can　properly　be　understood　only　on血e　basis　of血e　theory
of　custom．
Frederick　Whelan　observes血t，電in　fomi　it　pallarels　his　treatment　of　the　understand血g，
beginning　with　an　analysis　of　the　passions　of　the　individual　and　gradually　extending　its
observations　into　the　realm　of　collective　behavior．”However，　in　my　opinion，　the
pallarelism　of　Book　1　and　Book　2　of止e　Treatise　lies　not　so　much　in　Hume’s　o切ectS　of
consideration　as　in　the　process　of　the　generalization　of　the　perceptions．　See「冊elan
l985，p．ll8．
Hume　is　a　conservative　neither　of　his　time　nor　of　today．　He　was　a　most　radical　critic　of
the　conven廿on　of　his　time．　It　is　a面stake　to　say　that　he　insists　on　the丘xadon　of　the
present　property　system・His　theory　is　to　explain　how　the　notion　ofjustice　and　society　is
created　based　on　proper呼．
Reca1田㎜e’s　similar　explanation　regarding　external　object．
This　relates　to　the　thesis　that”taste”is　the負ユndamental　concept　fbr　the　Scottish
Enlightenment．　ln　this　regard，　Hume’s”Of出e　Stan（lard　of　Taste”is　especially　impo血mt
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Cf　Broadie，　A．（ed．），7乃e　Cambri’dge（］ompanion　to　SeotttSh　Enlightenment，　Cambridge：
Cambridge　University　kess，2003，　Ch．14．　David　Hume，　E∬ays　Moral，　Political，　and
Literary，　ed．　E．　F．　Miller，　Indianapolis：Liberty　Classics，1985．　Herea食er　abbreviated　as
l巳dssays，，．
Hobbes　reg曲money　as　a”measure”of　all　commodities，　and　compares　it舳e”Bloud
（SIC．）’，of出e　co㎜onweal血伽α伽174），　while　Locke　considers　money　as　a　meanS
for　prese曲g　goodS．　Though　Hume　does　not　discuss　money止ema姻1y㎞血e　Treatise，
the　idea　of量’interest，曾as　socially　constructed　is　indicative　of　his　idea　of　money　as　an
’1interest”．　Hume　asserts　that　industry　and　refinement　of　all　kinds　promote　universal
diffusion　and　c圃ation　of　money，　which　strengthens　the　kmgdom（Essay，”Ofmoney1「）．
This　is　later　to　be　rephrased　by　Adam　Smith　as　the’冒division　of　labour”．　C£Whelan，
1985，p．235．
This　form　of　interdependency　anticipates　Hume’s出θoly　ofpromise．　Promise　is　based　on
interdependence　in　a　more　and　more　explicit　manner．　In血is　sense　Hume’s　theory　of
property　underlies　his　theory　of　promise．
1曲e助吻，Hume　emphasises止at出e　purPose　of　justice　is　”the　genera1　interest　of
mankind”（EPM　3．28；SBN　l　95）．　This　clearly　suggestS　that　justice◎onsists　in　generality・
It　is　very　conspicuous　that　Hume　explains　justice　refer血1g　to　the　notion　of”generality”in
Eη9μめノ．
This　is　dif〔erent　fヒom　the　long－teml　ef〔1：ct　of　the　single　action　as　long　as　it　is　still　seen　as
asingle　action．　Therefore，　justice　has　nothing　to　do　with　the　term　of　interest，　long　or
short．　John　Stewart　asserts　that”Hume「s　position　is　that　human　nature　remaitmg　constant
amd　the　economic　circumstances　rernaining　abOut　the　same，　both　justice　and　obedience　to
ago面gove㎜ent副ways蜘出e　long－terrn　interest　of　a　person　as　an　indi伽1”．　C£
Stewart，」．，　Opinion　and　Reform　in　Hume’s　1）olitical　Philosoρhy，　Princeton，　NJ・：
Pr血ceton　University　Press．　Stewarち1992，　p」77，
This　corresponds　to　his　calling　custom　a”magical　power　ofmind”．
It　is㎞possible　fbr　a　sovereign　to　exert　physical　power　to　make　people　obey　the　law
when　a　significant　number　of　people　disobey血e　au止o晦On出e　o出er　h瞬it　would
be　a　contradiction　to　the　empiricist　tenet　to　assume　that　an　eterna1　”natural　law”　that　bindS
all　the　peoPle　exists．
To　be　more　exact，　positive　obligation　is　a　derivative　fbrm　of　negative　obligation．　For
example，　modem　states　are　obliged　to　provide　basic　human　needs．　Ths　is　because　not　to
do　so　can　be　inte叩reted　as　robbing　man　of　his　basic　human　needs．　This　is　based　on　the
fUndamenta1　idea　of　nature　as　the　supplier　of　human　necessity．　Tlhis　is血e　Humean
rephrasing　of　Locke’s　dictum　that　GOd　had　given　the　eanh　to　mankind　in　common．丘e
implication　is　that　where　people　can　no　longer　survive　Without　taking　f「（）m　others，　justice
can　no　longer　obta㎞．
David　Miller　says，　Hume”might　argue　that　it　was　a　matter　of　comparative　indifference
which　p血ciples　of　acquisition，　transfer，　etc．　were　adopte（L　provided　that　these　principles
were　generally　acknowledged　by　the　population　at　1arge．　It　is，　in　other　words，　a　mistake
to　look　fbr　a　justification　of　the　principles　which　fin　out　the　property　theory；what　can　be
justified　is　the　system　of　property　as　a　whole，　not、its　detailed　rules・In　this　way　questions
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about　desert　never　enter　the　picture；the　Lockean　pri　lciple　ofacquisidon　can　be　accepted，
not　as　an　ethically　justified　principle，　but　as　a　convention　whose　value　is　that　it　assigns
pro崎鱗somehow㎝d血at　it　commandS　general　recognition．．．．　A1血ou帥止ese
nlles（five　rUles　of　acqUisition　plus　a　rule　of　tramsfer）would　naturally　suggest　themselves
to　anyone　who　had　to　decide　on　the　allocation　of　property　rights，　they　were　neither
capable　of，　nor　stood　in　need　of，　justification　in　the　strict　sense”．　See　Miller，　D．，”Jus廿ce
and　Proper電ジ，　Ratio，　vo1．22，　P　9．
See　also　EMP　Appendix　3．10；SBN　308－9．
Plamenatz，　J．，　Man　and　Society，　lk）ndon：Lon騨voL　1，1963，　PP．309－10．
Hume　denies　equality　as止e　p血1鰐req曲ment制usdce．　Most　of　all，血ere　is　no
impression　correspOndmg　to璽’equality“．　The　notion　of　equahty　is　l巨rst　understood　with
the　estal）lishment　ofthe　concqpt　of，電idendty脚．
David　Miller　criticises　Lockean　labour　theory　in　that”it　is　then　no　longer　possible　to
sepalate　questions　about　the　original　acquisition　of　property丘om　questions　about　the
distributive　pattern　that　later　resU　ltS　fbom　these　acqUisitions”。　See　Miller，　D．，”Justice　and
㎞〕perCジ，　Ratio，　voL　22，1980，　P．9．
This　idea　seems　to　lie　behnd　Hume電s　optimism出at　co㎜erce　promotes舳d　momli取
hl　society（Essays，，，Ofthe　Progress　of／Art”）．
This　paper　is　an　amendment　of　my”Justice　and　the　Stability　of　Property　in　Hume”
（Bu〃θtin　ofKeiwa　College，　No．9，2000，　pp．29－64）．　I　am　gratefUl　to　Prof　Allan　Blond6
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